Let G = (V, E) be a graph and let r, s, k be natural numbers.
Introduction
Let G = (V, E) be a graph, possibly infinite, and let r, s, k be natural numbers. "Revolutionaries and Spies", G(G, r, s, k), is the following two-player game, invented by Beck [1] . In round 0, player 1 places r markers called revolutionaries on the vertices of G. Then player 2 places s markers called spies on the vertices. There is no restriction on the number of spies and revolutionaries that may be placed on a vertex. For i ≥ 1, round i begins with player 1 moving each revolutionary either to a vertex adjacent to its current vertex or by leaving it at its current vertex. Round i ends with player 2 moving his spies in the same fashion. Player 1 has a meeting of size k at a vertex v if k or more revolutionaries are present at that vertex. A set of vertices is guarded if a spy is present at some vertex in the set. Player 1 wins G(G, r, s, k) if he has a strategy to achieve an unguarded meeting of size k by the end of some round i. Otherwise player 2 has a strategy to block this and we say player 2 wins G(G, r, s, k).
Let k(G, r, s) be the maximum value of k such that player 1 wins G(G, r, s, k).
We define G(G, r, s) to be G(G, r, s, k 0 ) where k 0 = k(G, r, s). An optimum strategy for player 1 in G(G, r, s) is one eventually achieving an unguarded meeting of size k 0 . Similarly an optimum strategy for player 2 is one preventing a meeting of size k 0 + 1. We sometimes describe these just as player 1's (player 2's) strategies in G(r, s). Let s(G, r, k) be the minimum value s for which it is possible for player 2 to win G(G, r, s, k).
We record the following trivial observation. This trivial lower bound is attained on the following classes of graphs. We also study revolutionaries and spies on Z ⊠d , primarily for d = 2.
Perhaps one of the most basic (yet non-trivial) quantities to study is the threshold s d (r) := s(Z ⊠d , r, 2). .
Note that the best such result obtainable using Lemma 1.1 is lim inf r→∞
The organization of the paper is as follows. We present a number of basic definitions and results in Section 2. Then we prove Theorem 1.2 in Section 3 and Theorem 1.3 in Section 4. We outline a few directions for further research in the concluding section.
Basic Results
Lemma 2.1 Let G be a graph and let r, r ′ , s, s ′ ∈ N with r ≤ r ′ and s ≤ s ′ .
Then
1. k(G, r, 0) = r and k(G, r, r) = 0.
2. k(G, r ′ , s) ≥ k(G, r, s), and
Proof: To prove k(G, r, r) = 0, player 2 can match each spy with a unique revolutionary. Each spy is then moved to its matched revolutionary's position at the end of each round. To prove statement 2, first note that player 2 has a strategy to prevent an unguarded meeting of size
Player 2 can then prevent a meeting of this size in G(r, s) by "pretending" that player 1 has an additional r ′ − r revolutionaries left fixed at some arbitrary fixed vertex. Player 2 then moves according to the strategy in G(r ′ , s).
Similarly, to prove statement 3, we see that player 2 can keep s ′ − s spies fixed at some arbitrary vertex and then play his optimum strategy in G(r, s) with his remaining s spies to prevent a meeting of size k(G, r, s)+1 in G(r, s ′ ). 
For all graphs
2. Let n ≥ 0 and suppose G 1 , . . . , G ℓ are subgraphs of a graph G with
Suppose that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, player 1 has a strategy to win G(G, r i , s i , k i ) in at most n rounds with all revolutionaries starting and remaining in V (G i ). Then
Proof: To prove statement 1, player 2 partitions player 1's revolutionaries into groups of sizes r i for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and also partitions the spies into groups of size s i . Thereafter he simultaneously uses his ith group of spies to prevent a meeting of size k(G, r i , s i ) + 1 amongst the ith group of revolutionaries, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. Clearly, player 1 cannot achieve a meeting of size
To prove statement 2, we first note that the proof of Lemma 2.1, statement 3 gives for each 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ a "unified" strategy for player 1 to achieve an unguarded meeting of size k i by the end of round n, in G(G, r i , t) for all t ≤ s i , using the same starting position in G i . Player 1 pretends that there are s i − t spies fixed at some arbitrary vertex and then plays his strategy for G(G, r i , s i , k i ) while player 2 moves his t spies. The initial position for player 1 is the same for all t ≤ s i . Player 1 makes these uniform initial placements of r i revolutionaries in each G i . For some i, there must be t ≤ s i spies placed 7 in B G (V (G i ), n). Thus player 1 can achieve an unguarded meeting of size k i in G i in n rounds.
The following statements are all easy corollaries of Lemma 2.2, statement 1.
Lemma 2.4 For all graphs G and for all R, r, s ∈ N we have k(G, R, s) ≥ R r k(G, r, s).
and R r ≤ R 1 + 1. Let player 1 partition his revolutionaries into r groups of sizes R i and then place each member of the ith group on the position of revolutionary i in some optimum strategy for G(r, s). This strategy allows player 1 to achieve an unguarded meeting of size at least
The next result follows directly from the definition of k(G, r, s).
Lemma 2.5 Suppose G is a graph whose components are
where functions f, g : I → N satisfy r = i f (i), s = i∈I g(i) respectively.
and
We say X is finite if X has finite weight. If X : V (G) → N we call X a X , X ′ ∈ P(G, m) and X ′ is one move from X then we denote this by X ′ ∼ X .
Let G be a graph and let v be a vertex in
Lemma 2.6 Let G = (V, E) be a graph and let m ≥ 0. Let X , X ′ ∈ P(G, m).
X ∼ X ′ if and only if there is a function Q : V × V → N satisfying the following properties.
1. Q(v, w) = 0 for all v, w with {v, w} ∈ E.
For all
Proof: If Q satisfies the three properties above it is clear that X ′ is one move from X , as one can move from X to X ′ by moving Q(v, w) revolutionaries from v to w for all v, w ∈ V .
Suppose now that X ′ is one move from X . 
It is clear that Q ′ satisfies the properties with respect to X and X ′ .
If Q satisfies the properties in Lemma 2.6 then we call Q a move from X to
Hall's theorem gives another characterization of when two positions are connected by a single move. Given
Theorem 2.7 Let G = (V, E) be a graph and let m ≥ 0. Let X , X ′ ∈ P(G, m). Then the following are equivalent.
Proof: Note that it suffices to show statements 1 and 2 are equivalent. If we move from position X ′ to position X , then X (X), the number of revolutionaries in X at the end of the move, must be less than or equal to X ′ (X (1) ), the number of revolutionaries that may reach X in one move. It remains to
show that statement 2 implies statement 1.
Let U = {(1, x 1 ), . . . , (r, x r )} be a listing of the revolutionaries in X in some fixed order, i.e. for all i ∈ [r] revolutionary i is at vertex x i . Similarly
only if B has a perfect matching, i.e. each revolutionary in X has a unique target revolutionary in X ′ to which it can move. It is well known that this perfect matching exists if and only if Hall's condition holds: |N(S)| ≥ |S| for all S ⊆ U, where N(S) = {w ∈ W : ∃s ∈ S {w, s} ∈ E(B)}. We show that statement 2 implies Hall's condition.
Note that we may have |X| < t as there may be repeti-
These expressions for X (X) and |S| are derived by partitioning the revolutionaries counted according to the vertex on which they lie. Similarly we get
Using this expression we get
of Lemma 2.7 shows that X ∼ X ′ if and only if
If e = {v, w} ∈ E(T ) we let T (v, w) be the component of T −e containing
Suppose T is a tree. To prove X ∼ X ′ on T it suffices to only check
) on a subclass of vertex sets X.
Theorem 2.8 Let T = (V, E) be a tree and let m ≥ 0. Let X , X ′ ∈ P(G, m).
Then the following are equivalent.
We require the following lemma.
Lemma 2.9 Let T be a tree and let X ⊆ V (G).
If T [X] is a tree,
3. If T [X (1) ] is a tree,
Proof: Statement 1 follows from basic graph theory arguments showing that the edges of (X, X c ) are in one-to-one correspondence with the compo-
. Statement 2 then follows from 1 with the observation
Statement 3 follows easily from 2.
Proof of Lemma 2.8. By Lemma 2.7 it suffices to show that statement 2 implies statement 1. Suppose statement 2 holds. By Lemma 2.7 it suffices
] is a tree.
Then by Lemma 2.9,
For the general case, write T [X (1) ] = i∈I T i as a disjoint union of trees.
If G is a graph the nth power of G is the graph
Lemma 2.10 For all graphs G and all n, r, s ∈ N, k(G n , r, s) ≤ k(G, r, s).
Proof: If player 2 has a strategy to prevent an unguarded meeting of size k+1 in G, then it can prevent such a meeting in G n as follows. Initially, player 2 places the spies according to an optimum strategy in G(G, r, s). Suppose R and S are the positions of the revolutionaries and the spies, respectively, at the beginning of some round. Suppose player 1 moves from R to R ′ in
the position played by the spies in response to R i according to the strategy in G(G, r, s). Clearly S ′ = S n is one move from S in G n and continues to prevent an unguarded meeting of size k + 1 by R ′ .
Lemma 2.11 For graphs G, H, we have
Proof:
) and so by Lemma 2.7,
Given a position R 1 ∈ P(G ⊠ H, r) for player 1, let S 1 = S 1 (R 1 ) ∈ P(G ⊠ H, s) be an optimum response for player 2 in G(G ⊠ H, r, s). That is, by playing S 1 player 2 will prevent a meeting of size k + 1. We claim that if R 0 ∈ P(G, r) is a position for player 1 then it is always possible for player 2 to play S 0 = S 0 (R 0 ) := P (S 1 (L(R 0 ))) ∈ P(G, s) and that this will prevent a meeting of size k + 1 in G(G, r, s).
It is also clear from the statements proven in the previous
As
.
We need a lemma first. Given X ∈ P(Z, m) let f i (X ) be the ith order statistic of X , i.e. f i (X ) = j if and only if X ((−∞, j]) ≥ i and X ((−∞, j)) < i.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. 
To prove Theorem 1.2 we first use Lemma 3.3 below to reduce to the case in which G is a tree and r = ks + k + s.
Lemma 3.3 Let r, s, k ∈ N. Let G be a graph. Consider the following statements.
1. If G is a tree and r = ks + k + s, then k(G, r, s) ≤ If R ∈ P(G, r) is a position for player 1 and k ∈ N we define R :
for subsets S ⊆ V (G). Note that R(S) gives the number of meetings of size k + 1 that player 2 can theoretically form. We will shortly construct a spies' response function S = S(R) with the strong property that S(H) ≥ R(H) for all subtrees H, thereby guarding all meetings. We'll later
show that this property can be maintained as the revolutionaries move. Note that R(S) depends on R and k but we will suppress these variables as they will be thought of as fixed in our proofs.
Let T be a tree (finite or countably infinite). If e = {v, w} ∈ E(T ) recall that T (v, w) is the component of T − e containing w. For positions R, S, or for any auxiliary function R = R(R, k), we define R(v, w) := R(T (v, w)),
S(v, w) := S(T (v, w)), and R(v, w) := R(T (v, w)).
Given a position R ∈ P(T, ks + k + s) we define the spies' response function S = S(R, k) by S(v) := s − w∼v R(v, w). Note that since R is finite, the sum in the definition of S(v) has only finitely many non-zero terms.
Lemma 3.4 Let T be a finite or countably infinite tree. Let r, s, k ∈ N satisfy r = ks + k + s. Let R, R ′ ∈ P(T, r) and S = S(R, k),
Then the following statements hold for all v ∈ V (T ), {v, w} ∈ E(T ), and all finite subtrees H of T .
Proof: To prove 1, we note that r = R(v, w)
We now prove statement 2.
by statement 1 and the fact that
we may divide by k + 1 and take floors to get We now prove statement 5. Since R ∼ R ′ , Lemma 2.8 implies that for all v ∈ V (T ) and all
. Dividing by k + 1 and
The last inequality in the previous statement follows from statement 2. Thus by Lemma 2.8, S ∼ S ′ .
Theorem 3.5 Let T be a tree and let r, s, k ∈ N satisfy r = ks + k + s. Then
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Player 2 can prevent an unguarded meeting of size k + 1 in G(T, r, s) by always playing S(R, k) ∈ P(T, s) in response to player 1's move R ∈ P(T, r). By Lemma 3.4, statements 2, 4 and 5, we have
which implies all meetings of size k +1 or more are guarded, and
Corollary 3.6 Theorem 1.2 holds.
Proof: Use Lemma 3.3 to reduce Theorem 1.2 to Theorem 3.5. Then either all spies must have their x-coordinates strictly less than 3 or all spies must have their x-coordinates strictly greater than −3. If the former holds, the revolutionaries at (3, 3) and (3, −3) can win at (6, 0) in 3 rounds.
The latter case is symmetric.
We now assume player 2 initially places at least 2 spies outside of B 2 .
Case 2: Suppose player 2 initially places at most 1 spy within B 1 .
At most 3 spies may be placed within By symmetry about the line y = x, we may now assume that either the east internal wall is unguarded or the south internal wall is unguarded.
Case 3a 1 : Suppose the east internal wall is unguarded.
A spy must be placed on the east outer wall to be able to block wins Only the spy at (−1, −1) can guard the first meeting and consequently only the spy in L 6 can guard either of the other two meetings. Thus player 1 wins.
We now assume there are exactly two spies outside B 2 . As these must guard (6, 0), (0, 6), (−6, 0), and (0, −6) we can exploit symmetry and assume they are at (3, 3) and (−3, −3). 
Conclusion
It would be of interest to get tight bounds on k(Z ⊠d , r, s). It would be also interesting to extend the result on trees to some larger class of graphs, perhaps characterizing those graphs for which k(G, r, s) = when G is chordal.
Continuous versions of this problem can be considered. For example one could play the game in the plane, where each agent has the power to move to points within a Euclidean distance of 1 from their current position. This particular variant was suggested by Beck [1] .
